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Abstract—The Authentication and Authorization for Con-
strained Environments (ACE) framework provides fine-grained
access control in the Internet of Things, where devices are
resource-constrained and with limited connectivity. The ACE
framework defines separate profiles to specify how exactly
entities interact and what security and communication protocols
to use. This paper presents the novel ACE IPsec profile, which
specifies how a client establishes a secure IPsec channel with
a resource server, contextually using the ACE framework to
enforce authorized access to remote resources. The profile
makes it possible to establish IPsec Security Associations, either
through their direct provisioning or through the standard
IKEv2 protocol. We provide the first Open Source implemen-
tation of the ACE IPsec profile for the Contiki OS and test
it on the resource-constrained Zolertia Firefly platform. Our
experimental performance evaluation confirms that the IPsec
profile and its operating modes are affordable and deployable
also on constrained IoT platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to network scenarios
where billions of devices communicate over IP networks
and are available on the Internet. This includes everyday
objects and appliances, and has been constantly fostering a
number of use cases and business opportunities, from sensor
and actuator networks to smart buildings, from monitoring
of critical infrastructures to controlled resource sharing. As
more and more applications are being developed, the IoT is
expected to have a huge impact on the way we live and work.
At the same time, security plays a fundamental role, even
during this transition process. In fact, ensuring security in
IoT scenarios is of vital importance to counteract information
breaches and service dysfunctions, which may result in severe
performance degradation and privacy violations, or even
threaten safety of people and infrastructures. Securing the IoT
is thus vital to ensure its successful deployment and adoption.
However, unlike in traditional networks, IoT devices are
typically resource-constrained, i.e. equipped with limited
resources. That is, they are scarce as to processing power,
Fig. 1: IoT applications can secure their communications by
using the ACE framework and the different security profiles.
storage and energy availability, often being battery-powered.
Besides, most IoT devices are wirelessly connected over low-
power and lossy networks, thus exhibiting limited connectiv-
ity and availability. Also, they often lack traditional user in-
terfaces, and are likely deployed in unattended environments.
As a result, protecting billions of IoT devices with traditional
approaches is challenging, which fosters the development of
novel security solutions suitable for the IoT. Yet, many of
these solutions do not base on established standards and are
difficult to scrutinize in terms of their security guarantees.
The first security challenge consists in efficiently enabling
secure communication and message exchange. Due to the
resource-constrained nature of typical IoT devices, their great
heterogeneity and their large-scale deployment, it is not feasi-
ble to rely on solutions for traditional network environments.
To this end, a number of secure communication protocols
for the IoT are available and have been increasingly adopted
in constrained environments. In particular, [1] and [2] show
how 6LoWPAN header compression mechanisms optimize
security protocols to be deployable in resource-constrained
networked scenarios. However, it can be very difficult to
provision millions, or even billions, of resource-constrained
IoT devices with the cryptographic keys necessary to securely
communicate and operate. Even the establishment of secure
sessions based on pre-shared symmetric keys can easily result
in hard-to-manage and poorly scalable key distribution.
The second critical security aspect concerns authorization
and access control. Typically, a Client wants to access a
resource hosted on a Resource Server (RS), which is often
deployed as a resource-constrained device. This requires the
Client and the RS to mutually authenticate, and must permit
the RS to verify Client requests as previously authorized.
In order to enable fine-grained and flexible access control
in the IoT, the Authentication and Authorization for Con-
strained Environments (ACE) framework has been proposed
[3], building on the authorization framework OAuth 2.0 [4].
The ACE framework relies on an Authorization Server
(AS), that has a trust relation with the RS and authorizes re-
source accesses from requesting Clients, based on pre-defined
policies. However, the ACE framework admits the definition
of separate profiles describing how these actors interact with
each other and what communication and security protocols
they use. A few profiles have been proposed, including [5] for
the DTLS protocol [6], as well as [7] for OSCORE [8]. The
choice of the particular profile to use has to take into account
the specific use case and its security requirements, as well
as the related trust and security models. This naturally leads
to the most suitable communication and security protocols
to adopt, and hence to the related profile describing how to
use them in the ACE framework. Figure 1 shows how an
IoT application for home automation can leverage on the
ACE Framework profiles, e.g. a traditional Internet host like
a Smart phone can secure its communications with a smart
lock using IPsec, DTLS or OSCORE.
This paper presents the novel ACE IPsec profile, which
describes how Client and RS set up and use an IPsec channel
[9], contextually with the access control enforced by the AS.
The profile displays two key benefits tightly paired with the
access control provided by the ACE framework.
First, it enables secure communication between Client
and RS at the network layer, by flexibly leveraging the
IPsec security protocols AH [10] and ESP [11], and thus
counteracting network-layer attacks such as IP spoofing. This
is fundamentally achieved by establishing IPsec Security
Associations between Client and RS. Second, it efficiently
addresses the provisioning of key material, by embedding the
process in the authorization workflow of the ACE framework
and taking advantage of the AS. Specifically, the IPsec
Security Associations can be generated by the AS, and then
directly provided to Client and RS. As an alternative, the
AS provides the Client and RS with the necessary key
material to establish the IPsec Security Associations through
the standard IKEv2 protocol [12], based either on symmetric
or asymmetric cryptography.
In order to encourage wider acceptance and interoperabil-
ity across multiple vendors, we submitted a draft description
of our profile to the IETF for possible standardization [13].
The draft focuses on the theoretical contribution and practical
considerations, and it does not refer to a particular implemen-
tation or experimental evaluation of the IPsec profile.
In this paper, we additionally describe our implementation
of the ACE framework and the ACE IPsec profile for the
Contiki OS [14]. We test it on real IoT devices using
the resource-constrained Zolertia Firefly platform [15]. Our
implementation covers all the actors in the ACE framework
and is available as open source software at [16]. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of the ACE
framework for the Contiki OS, and the first one ever of its
IPsec profile. Additionally, it targets scenarios where even
the AS is a resource-constrained device.
We utilize our implementation to experimentally evaluate
the performance of the ACE framework when using the
novel IPsec profile under different channel establishment and
authentication methods. In particular, we consider message
size, memory and energy consumption, and time required
for the Client to perform an authorized resource access at the
RS. Our results confirm that the IPsec profile is affordable
on resource-constrained devices, and hence is effectively
deployable in IoT scenarios to enforce access control paired
with IPsec-based secure communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related work. Section III introduces background
concepts and technologies. In Section IV, the ACE IPsec
profile is introduced. Section V presents our performance
evaluation. Finally, Section VI draws conclusive remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Different profiles have been proposed for the Authentica-
tion and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
framework. In [5], Gerdes et al. describe the Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) profile, which delegates
the authorization and authentication of a Client device to the
establishment of a DTLS session [6] between the Client and a
Resource Server (RS). Specifically, DTLS can be used in the
symmetric Pre-Shared Key (PSK) mode or the asymmetric
Raw Public Key (RPK) mode. If the PSK mode is used,
the successful establishment of a DTLS session also acts as
a proof-of-possession (PoP) for the Client’s PSK. In case
the RPK mode is used, the Client is authenticated through
its asymmetric public key. Finally, this profile uses the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [17] over DTLS
between Client and RS. The feasibility of securing CoAP
messages with DTLS has been investigated in [1].
The OSCORE profile of ACE proposed by Seitz et al.
[7] provides communication security between Client and RS
by means of the Object Security for Constrained RESTful
Environments (OSCORE) protocol [8]. OSCORE ensures
request/response binding and selectively protects CoAP mes-
sages at the application layer, by using the compact CBOR
Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [18] based on the
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [19] as data
encoding format. This provides true end-to-end secure com-
munication between Client and RS, even in the presence of
(untrusted) intermediary CoAP proxies, which remain able
to perform their intended operations (e.g. message caching).
This is not possible when DTLS is used, as it requires
transport-layer security to be terminated at the proxy, which
is thus able to inspect and possibly alter the entire content of
CoAP messages exchanged between Client and RS. A secure
context can be established directly from a symmetric PoP key,
or by using external key establishment protocols. Currently,
the DTLS and OSCORE profiles have not been implemented
or evaluated for resource-constrained IoT devices.
Compared to the OSCORE profile, the IPSec profile
presented in this paper preserves and leverages a flexible
key establishment based on the IKEv2 protocol [12], tightly
paired with ACE authorization process. In addition, it makes
it possible to employ policy-based traffic filtering, also during
the actual establishment of IPsec channels between Client and
RS. In contrast, this feature is not available for the DTLS and
OSCORE profiles. Besides, we have implemented the IPsec
profile together with the ACE framework on the Contiki OS,
and tested it over resource-constrained IoT devices.
Finally, Sciancalepore et al. propose a different autho-
rization framework for the IoT [20], also based on OAuth
2.0 and other standard protocols. In particular, it provides
access control through an intermediary gateway acting as
mediator between IoT networks and non-constrained Internet
segments. However, unlike the ACE framework, [20] displays
a considerably higher level of complexity and requires the
intermediary gateway to be fully trusted.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the main concepts and building
blocks considered by the IPsec profile presented in the paper.
A. OAuth 2.0
A typical security requirement in the Internet is autho-
rization, i.e. the process for granting approval to a client that
wants to access a resource [21]. The Open Authentication
2.0 (OAuth 2.0) authorization framework has asserted itself
among the most adopted standards to enforce authorization
[4]. OAuth 2.0 relies on an Authorization Server (AS) entity,
and addresses all common issues of alternative approaches
based on credential sharing, by introducing a proper autho-
rization layer and separating the role of the actual resource
owner from the role of the client accessing a resource.
Specifically, OAuth 2.0 allows a client entity (e.g. a user,
a host) to obtain a specific and limited access to a remote
resource, hosted at a Resource Server (RS), while enforcing
the permission from the original resource owner. That is, the
resource owner grants authorization through the intermediary
AS, which in turn provides the client with an access token
including the actual authorization information. Access tokens
consist of strings that are opaque to the client and encode
decisions for authorized resource access in terms of duration
and scope. Such decisions are ultimately taken by the AS
and enforced by the RS upon processing the access token.
In addition, the AS prevents non-authorized parties from
tampering with issued access token or possibly generating
bogus ones. To this end, the client presents the access token
to the RS upon accessing the intended resource. Then, the
RS verifies that the access token is valid, before proceeding
with processing and serving the request from the client. This
requires that: i) the client is pre-registered at the AS; ii) the
AS securely communicates with both the client and the RS;
and iii) the AS and RS have pre-established a trust relation.
An AS may be associated with multiple RSs at the same
time. The involved parties perform RESTful interactions via
the HTTP protocol [22], contacting the RESTful endpoints
associated to specific steps in the OAuth 2.0 flow.
The approach adopted by OAuth 2.0 has become more
and more important in IoT scenarios, where heterogeneous
and resource constrained devices are deployed on a large
scale, often configured as RS. However, these peculiarities
make OAuth 2.0 as is not suitable for the IoT. This mo-
tivated the design of the Authentication and Authorization
for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework [3], as a
standard proposal under the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). The ACE framework builds on OAuth 2.0 in order to
adapt and extend it for enforcing authorization in constrained
IoT environments. To this end, it uses the basic OAuth 2.0
mechanisms where possible, while also providing application
developers with extensions, profiles and additional guidance
to ensure a privacy-oriented and secure usage.
a) Actors: The ACE framework considers the fol-
lowing four actors, in accordance with the main paradigm
inherited from OAuth 2.0.
Client: the entity accessing a remote protected resource.
Resource Server (RS): the entity hosting protected resources
and serving requests from authorized clients. Authorization is
enforced through access tokens that requesting clients provide
to the endpoint /authz-info at the RS via a POST request.
Authorization Server (AS): the entity authorizing Clients
to access protected resources at the RS. The AS is typically
equipped with plenty of resources and hosts two endpoints:
i) the /token endpoint, for receiving Access Token Requests
from Clients; and ii) the /introspect endpoint, that the RS can
use to query for extra information on received access tokens.
Resource Owner (RO): the entity owning a protected re-
source hosted at the RS, and entitled to grant access to it. The
RO can dynamically provide its consent for giving a Client
access to a protected resource, according to the traditional
OAuth flows. However, the ACE framework is especially
tailored to resource-constrained settings, where such consent
is typically pre-configured as authorization policies at the AS.
Such policies are then evaluated by the AS upon receiving a
token request from a Client. In particular, the policies from
the RO influence what claims the AS ultimately includes into
the access token released to a requesting client.
b) Building Blocks: From an operational point of
view, the ACE framework consists of the following building
blocks.
OAuth [4] defines the overall authentication paradigm result-
ing in the protocol flows and actors’ interaction.
CoAP [17] is a RESTful application-layer protocol for the
IoT, typically running over UDP and able to greatly limit
overhead and message exchanges. As CoAP is lightweight
and tailored to resource-constrained IoT devices, it is the
preferred choice in the ACE framework. Also, CoAP has
been designed to explicitly support operations of intermedi-
ary Proxy nodes.
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [19] is a
compact version of JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [23],
i.e. a light-weight format for data interchange which is easy
to create and process. In particular, CBOR enables binary
encoding of small messages conveying self-contained access
tokens, CoAP POST parameters, and CoAP responses.
CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [18]
enables application-layer security in the ACE framework,
especially in order to secure access tokens.
c) Authorization credentials: In order to access pro-
tected resources hosted at a RS, a Client must get the right
authorization credentials in the form of an access token.
Specifically, an access token is a data structure including
authorization permissions issued by the AS, provided to the
Client, and delivered to the RS for authorized resource access.
Access tokens are opaque to the Client, i.e. their semantics
are unknown to the Client, and are cryptographically pro-
tected, e.g. by means of COSE [18]. That is, access tokens
are intelligible only to the RS and the AS.
A proof-of-possession (PoP) token is an access token
bound to a cryptographic key, which is used by the RS
to authenticate a Client request. PoP tokens rely on the
AS to act as Trusted Third Party (TTP), in order to bind
a PoP key (PoPK) to an access token. PoP keys can be
based on symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. In case of
a symmetric PoP key, the AS generates it and provides it to
the Client and the RS. To this end, the AS can: i) make it
available at the /introspect endpoint; or ii) provide it to the
RS (Client) in the access token (Access Token Response).
For asymmetric PoP keys, the Client generates a key pair,
and provides the public key to the AS in the Access Token
Request. Also, the AS provides the RS’ public key to the
Client in the Access Token Response. The Client’s public key
is made available to the RS through the /introspect endpoint,
or conveyed in the access token.
The ACE framework delegates to separate security pro-
files the description of how enforcing secure communication
and mutual authentication among the involved parties, as well
as the details about their specific interactions. In particular,
a security profile must specify: i) the communication and
security protocols between the RS and the Client, as well as
the methods to achieve mutual authentication; ii) the com-
munication and security protocols for interactions between
the Client and the AS; iii) the PoP protocols to use and how
to select one; and iv) the mechanisms to protect the /authz-
info endpoint at the RS. The AS informs the Client of the
specific profile to use by means of the profile parameter in the
Access Token Response. Also, the AS is expected to know
what profiles are supported by the Client and RS.
B. The ACE framework
The protocol flow in the ACE framework consists of the
following steps, also shown in Figure 2. Communications
between Client and AS as well as between RS and AS should
be secured, in accordance with the used security profile.
(A) Access Token Request. The Client sends an Access
Token Request to the /token endpoint at the AS. This includes
Fig. 2: ACE framework’s protocol flow (adapted from [3]).
information about the Client’s credentials and the requested
permissions for accessing the protected resource at the RS.
(B) Access Token Response + RS Information. Once it has
successfully processed the Access Token Request received at
step (A), the AS generates an access token and provides it to
the Client in the Access Token Response. The access token
and the Access Token Response include also RS information
and relevant parameters such as token type, expiration time,
scope, state, security profile to be used and PoP key.
(C) Token + Request. First, the Client sends the access
token to the /authz-info endpoint at the RS, followed by the
actual Resource Request at the specific resource endpoint.
The RS and the Client authenticate each other and set up
a secure communication channel, according to the security
profile specified by the AS and the related PoP keys. The
RS can validate the access token entirely by itself, or by
interacting with the AS via the /introspect endpoint.
(D) Introspection Request. The RS may send the access
token for validation to the /introspect endpoint at the AS. If
the access token is self-contained and the RS can validate it
by itself, this step as well as step (E) can be omitted.
(E) Token Introspection Response + Client Token. Upon
receiving an Introspection Request from the RS, the AS
validates the access token and replies to the RS. The response
includes extra information to achieve mutual authentication
between the Client and the RS. Additional parameters meant
to be forwarded to the Client are sent as a Client Token.
(F) Protected Resource Response. Once the access token
has been successfully validated and a secure channel has
been established, the RS processes the Resource Request
received from the Client at step (C). Then, the RS provides
the requested resource to the Client over the established
secure channel, in accordance with the used security profile.
C. IPsec and IKEv2
The IPsec suite is a collection of protocols to secure
IP-based communications at the network layer [9]. It fun-
damentally relies on Security Associations (SAs), each of
which describes how to secure a one-way channel between
two parties. Thus, two SAs are required to secure a two-way
communication channel. An IPsec SA is identified by a Se-
curity Parameters Index (SPI), and it specifies cryptographic
material, as well as the parameters and protocols to secure IP
packets through the IPsec channel. This includes the security
protocol to be used, i.e. Authentication Header Protocol (AH)
[10] or Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) [11].
In particular, AH enables connectionless integrity and
data origin authentication. Instead, ESP provides confiden-
tiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity,
replay protection and limited traffic flow confidentiality.
Although both protocols provide integrity protection, AH
additionally protects the header of IP packets. Both AH and
ESP can operate in two modes, namely transport and tunnel.
The former processes IP packets without changing the IP
headers, while the latter encapsulates the original IP packet
into a new one, thus protecting its payload and header.
Finally, SAs are established manually or dynamically, e.g.
by using Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2)
[12] as key exchange protocol. In particular, IKEv2 enables
mutual authentication between two parties through a Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange, using the pre-shared key (PSK)
or the certificate raw public key (Cert) mode. The usual
execution of IKEv2 consists of two pairs of request/response
messages, i.e. IKE SA INIT and IKE AUTH. This estab-
lishes: i) an IKEv2 SA to protect IKEv2 traffic; and ii) a
first IPsec SA to protect the actual IP traffic. Further SAs
can be derived through CREATE CHILD SA messages.
IV. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the ACE IPsec profile. The
profile provides an operative instance of the ACE framework,
by defining the communication and security protocols used
by a Client to perform an authenticated and authorized access
to a protected resource hosted at a Resource Server (RS). In
particular, it considers the IPsec protocol suite and the IKEv2
key management protocol to enforce secure communications
between Client and RS, server authentication and proof-of-
possession bound to an ACE access token.
Hereafter, we denote with SA-C the SA used for the
unidirectional IPsec channel from the Client to the RS, while
with SA-RS the SA used for the unidirectional IPsec channel
from the RS to the Client. Also, information to build SAs is
encoded as the newly introduced ipsec structure in the ACE
access token. Such information includes: i) two SPIs, namely
SPI SA C and SPI SA RS; ii) the IPsec mode, i.e. transport
or tunnel; iii) the security protocol, i.e. AH or ESP; iv)
cryptographic keys; v) the key establishment method to fully
setup the two-way IPsec channel; and vi) the SAs’ lifetime.
In particular, SPI SA C (SPI SA RS) refers to SA-C (SA-
RS). In case tunnel mode is chosen, source and destination
IP addresses are also specified.
A. Key Establishment Methods
The IPsec profile provides three methods for establishing
a pair of SAs, and hence a two-way IPsec channel between
Client and RS. The three methods are: i) Direct Provi-
sioning (DP); ii) establishment with IKEv2 and symmetric-
key authentication; and iii) establishment with IKEv2 and
asymmetric-key authentication. For every method, the ipsec
structure always specifies the protocol mode, the security
protocol and the SAs’ lifetime. Instead, the SPIs, algorithm
and cryptographic keys are specified in different ways, de-
pending on the specific key establishment method. That is,
if the Direct Provisioning (DP) method is used, this set of
information are explicitly provided. Otherwise, that is IKEv2
is used as Key Management Protocol (KMP), this set of
information is not explicitly provided, but rather negotiated
and established when the Client and RS performs IKEv2.
The choice of the particular method to use should be
driven by the capabilities of the Client and RS, as well as by
the policies and infrastructure used in the specific use case
for provisioning and managing key material. In particular,
the DP method is extremely efficient and hence preferable
for very constrained devices, as the Client and RS do not
take the explicit burden to establish an SA pair. However,
it does not provide strict assurances in terms of perfect
forward secrecy. On the other hand, the two methods based
on IKEv2 do provide perfect forward secrecy, as a native
feature of the IKEv2 protocol. However, this requires the
Client and RS to perform a full establishment of their SA pair
through IKEv2, with a consequent considerable commitment
in terms of resources. The particular choice among IKEv2
symmetric-key and asymmetric-key authentication method
really depends on the key infrastructure of the specific use
case. While Certificate-based public keys are typically more
cumbersome to handle and process, they are often preferable
to pre-shared keys that do result in more efficient processing
while at the same in more complicated provisioning and
management operations. In the following, we provide more
details about the three key establishment methods.
1) Direct Provisioning (DP). In this method, the SA pair is
pre-defined by the AS. That is, SA-RS and SA-C are specified
in the access token and in the RS Information of the Access
Token Response that the AS sends to the Client. Note that
the AS cannot guarantee the uniqueness of the SPI SA C
identifier at the RS, and of the SPI SA RS identifier at
the Client. In order to address possible collisions with a
previously defined SPI, the AS generates SPI SA C and
SPI SA RS as random values. By doing so, the probability
of a collision to occur is at most 2−32 for 32-bit long SPIs.
In case a collision occurs at the RS, i.e. the RS receives an
access token with a SPI SA C value already used by another
SA, the RS replies to the Client with an error message and
aborts the setup of the IPsec channel. In network scenario
scenarios where such additional overhead is not affordable,
it is possible to reserve in advance a pool of SPI values
intended to be used only with the DP method. This pool is
exclusively managed by the AS. Then, when an IPsec channel
is closed and the related pair of SAs become stale, the RS
asks the AS to restore the SPI of that SA-C as available.
Instead, in case a collision occurs at the Client, i.e. the
Client receives a SPI SA RS value already used by other
SA, the Client sends a second Access Token Request to the
AS, asking for an updated access token. This token request
also includes an ipsec structure containing only the field
SPI SA RS specifying an available identifier to use. Then,
the AS replies with the corresponding Access Token and RS
Information updated only as to the requested SPI SA RS.
2) IKEv2 with symmetric-key authentication. This method
uses the IKEv2 protocol to establish the SA pair between
Client and RS, while providing mutual authentication through
symmetric cryptography. The Client and RS run IKEv2 in
symmetric mode, using a symmetric PSK provided by AS
and bound to the access token as a PoP key. The PSK is
made available to the Client in the Access Token Response,
and to the RS in the access token. If the Client is interacting
with the RS for the first time, the AS includes also a unique
key identifier of the PSK in the Access Token Response.
Otherwise, the Client includes in the Access Token Request
a key identifier pointing at a previously established PSK.
3) IKEv2 with asymmetric-key authentication. This
method uses the IKEv2 protocol to establish the SA pair be-
tween Client and RS, while providing mutual authentication
through asymmetric cryptography. The Client and RS run
IKEv2 in asymmetric mode, using their RPK or Certificate-
based Public Key (CPK) bound to the access token as PoP
keys. The RS’s RPK/CPK is made available to the Client in
the Access Token Response, while the Client’s RPK/CPK is
made available to the RS in access token. Similarly to the
previous method, if the Client is interacting with the AS for
the first time, it includes its RPK or CPK in the Access Token
Request. Otherwise, the Client includes a key identifier linked
to its own RPK or CPK, which is already available at the AS.
B. Protocol Description
In this section, we describe the message exchanges occur-
ing in the ACE framework, in the presence of our Internet
Protocol Security (IPsec) profile. Intuitively, the workflow
consists of three phases, as shown in Figure 3.
Phase (I) - Unauthorized Client to Resource Server. Dur-
ing this phase, the Client can retrieve information necessary
to contact the AS, unless already available. In particular,
the Client sends an unauthorized request to the RS, which
formally denies the request and replies by indicating the
associated AS to contact for obtaining an access token.
Phase (II) - Client to Authorization Server. During this
phase, the Client sends an Access Token Request to the /token
endpoint at the AS, indicating the resource of interest at the
RS and the access scope, i.e. the intended operations on such
resource. Then, the AS processes the Access Token Request
and verifies that the Client is allowed to access the specified
protected resource at the RS. In such a case, the AS replies
with an access token and the RS information as part of the
Access Token Response. In particular, the access token (RS
information) includes parameters and key material intended
for the RS (the Client) to set up an IPsec as a pair of SAs.
The exact information to exchange between the Client
and the AS depends on the SA establishment method IV-A.
Unlike the DP method, the alternative ones require the Client
and the RS to establish the SA pair by running IKEv2. To
this end, the AS indicates the specific KMP to use in the
kmp field of the access token and of the RS Information.
Specifically, kmp is set to ”ikev2” to signal the use of the
IKEv2 protocol. Provided that the involved parties have the
necessary support, it is possible to use and specify a different
key management protocol. Note that the AS is aware of the
Client’s and RS’s capabilities as well as of RS’s preferred and
supported communication settings [3]. Therefore, the AS is
Fig. 3: IPsec profile message exchange (adapted from [13]).
able to set the security and network Parameters for the SA
pair consistently with that Client-RS pair.
Phase (III) - Client to Resource Server In this phase, the
Client posts the access token to the /authz-info endpoint at
the AS, through a POST CoAP message. Then, the Client and
the RS set up the SA pair and the IPsec channel, based on
the establishment method signalled by the AS. In particular:
a) The DP method is signalled by the presence of the
ipsec structure, while the ”COSE Key” field is not present.1.
b) A symmetric-key authenticated establishment is sig-
nalled by including a ”COSE Key” object with the key type
parameter ”kty” set to ”Symmetric”, and by indicating the
usage of IKEv2 with the kmp field set to ”ikev2”.
c) An asymmetric-key authenticated establishment is in-
dicated by including a ”COSE Key” object with the key
type parameter ”kty” indicating the usage of asymmetric
cryptography, e.g. ”EC”, by and indicating the usage of
IKEv2 with the kmp field set to ”ikev2”.
In case the DP method is used, the Client and the RS
already have all the information to start the IPsec channel,
and do not need to explicitly interact with each other.
Instead, if any of the authenticated establishment methods
is used, the Client and the RS perform an actual SA pair
establishment through IKEv2 according to the authentication
mode indicated by the ”kty” field. In the following, we
describe how the client and Client and RS finalize/setup the
IPsec channel, given the specific establishment method.
a) Direct Provisioning. The Client derives all the nec-
essary key material from the ”seed” field of the ”ipsec”
structure in the RS Information. The Client uses the seed
to perform the a key derivation algorithm as in IKEv2 [12].
Upon correct submission and successful verification of the
access token at the /authz-info endpoint, the RS performs the
same key derivation process. The RS replies to the Client
over the IPsec channel, according to what specified in SA-
RS. Thereafter, any further communication performed during
1The ”COSE Key” is a CBOR object protected by using COSE, and
containing information about the used key material, such as key type, key
identifier, and the actual cryptographic key.
Fig. 4: Evaluation setup
the lifetime of the access token occurs over the IPsec channel
defined by the SA pair.
b) Authenticated SA Establishment using IKEv2. the
Client and the RS run the IKEv2 protocol, and use the
key material in the respectively received ”COSE key” object
in order to achieve mutual authentication. In particular, the
Client posts the access token to the /authz-info endpoint to the
RS, which sends back the first IKEv2 message IKE SA INIT
to acknowledge the correct reception of the access token.
Depending on the type of key used as PoP Key (PoPK), i.e.
symmetric or asymmetric, the IKEv2 protocol is executed
in the corresponding mode [12], i.e. PSK, CPK or RPK,
with no modifications. If the IKEv2 execution is successfully
completed, the Client and the RS agree on key material,
parameters and algorithms used to enforce the IPsec channel.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section we present the performance evaluation of
the different key establishment methods for the ACE IPsec
Framework, described in Section IV. The implementation
is written for Contiki OS [14] based on existing libraries
and protocol implementations [24]. In particular, our code
was evaluated on the Zolertia Firefly platform, equipped
with the CC2538 radio chipset, 32 kB of RAM and 512
kB of flash ROM [15]. A device of this class supports a
power supply from two AA (AAA) batteries, each of which
typically provides an energy content of 9.36 (5.07) KJ.
Our implementation leverage on hardware-based cryptog-
raphy and utilizes the following algorithms: AES-CCM* to
secure the IEEE 802.15.4 link layer and the COSE objects;
AES-128 to provide confidentiality for IPsec and IKEv2 with
an 8-bytes long Initialization Vector (IV); ECC-DH with 256-
bit Random ECP Group [25], SHA-2 and a Hash-based MAC
(HMAC) based on SHA-256 for the authenticated exchange
of IKEv2 [26], [27]. IPsec and IKEv2 traffic is encrypted
using ESP in transport mode. The scenario to be evaluated
is the following: a Client requests access a protected re-
source stored in a constrained RS. The authentication and
authorization of this request are delegated to the AS. In our
experimental setup the AS is as well a resource-constrained
device and performs routing related activities. Namely, it
is set as the root of the Direct Acyclic Graph (DAG) and
Fig. 5: Memory footprint comparison.
TABLE I: ACE Packet size and access token size in Bytes
Base DP IKE-PSK IKE-CPK
(A) 10 10 10 666
(B) 179 401 445 1697
(C) 188 299 321 947
(F) 23 23 23 23
Access Token 172 283 305 931
performs housekeeping operations for Routing Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)[28].
We evaluate four setup configurations: a baseline configu-
ration (Base), i.e. the ACE Framework w.o. the IPsec profile;
and the three key establishment methods: DP, Establishment
with symmetric key authentication (IKE-PSK) and Establish-
ment with asymmetric key authentication (IKE-CPK) [12].
Our experimental results include: memory footprint,
packet size and time and energy measurements. The latter
measurements are evaluated as the shown in Figure 4 which
depicts where time and energy measurements are performed.
This measurements are labeled as follows: (0) for Access
Token decoding; (1) for the Client to AS Exchange; (2)
for Access Token and RS Information encoding; (3) for the
Client to RS Exchange; (4) for the Access Token setup; and
(5) for the IPsec channel establishment.
In Table I we provide the size of packets exchanged by
our profile. The packet exchanges are labeled as in Figure
2. This measurements reflect the size of the CoAP messages.
The last row of Table I provides the size of the Access token,
which has a big influence on the message size.
In Figure 5 we provide the Memory Footprint evaluation
results for the different SA establishment methods of the
IPsec profile. We show the absolute value of ROM and RAM
footprints for the setups configuration Base, DP, IKE-PSK
and IKE-CPK.
Time measurements are collected using the system clock
measured in system ticks. To convert our measurements to
seconds the following formula is applied:
time =
sys clock
ticks/second
Note that measurements (1) and (3) include network latency
as round-trip time. Energy consumption measurements are
divided into three contributions: energy spent at the CPU,
(a) Time measurements (b) Energy measurements
Fig. 6: Token processing
(a) Time measurements (b) Energy measurements
Fig. 7: (1) Client to AS evaluation results
energy spent in transmission state (TX) and the energy
spent in reception state (RX). To measure the energy con-
sumed by the devices we use powertrace, a run-time power
profiling mechanism which is part of Contiki. This tool
has an accuracy of 94% with an 0.6% overhead [29]. The
energy consumption out of the powertrace measurements is
computed as follows:
energy =
powertrace value ∗ current ∗ voltage
ticks/second
For every setup configuration, 20 runs of the protocol
were considered. We give average results for successful hand-
shakes without packet loss. Note that wireless communication
can be lossy in constrained environments with a loss rate
typically increasing for larger packet sizes. In this case,
the handshake duration as well as the energy consumption
increase due to the retransmission of the packets.
In Figure 6 we show the time and energy results of
the access token processing. On the right side of the figure
we depict the contribution of the four steps involving token
processing, i.e. (0) Token decoding performed at the Client
and the RS, (2) Token encoding and (4) Token Setup, as in
Figure 4. On the left side, we categorized these operations
in crypto- and non-crypto-related actions.
The Client-to-AS message exchange results are shown
in Figure 7. In this figure we can observe Client-to-AS
network latency, processing time and energy consumption,
i.e. measurement (1) in Figure 4. A comparable performance
disregarding the SA establishment method can be observed.
(a) Time measurements (b) Energy measurements
Fig. 8: (3) Client to RS evaluation results
(a) Time measurements (b) Energy measurements
Fig. 9: (5) Secure Channel Establishment
Namely, the Access Token Request/Response present a con-
sistent behavior across the different setup configurations.
In Figure 8 we show the Client-to-RS message exchange
evaluation results, i.e. the measurement tag as (3) in Figure
4. We can observe that the results for the IKEv2-based
methods are comparable with the IKE-CPK, showing a
slightly bigger energy consumption. At the same time, DP
time and energy results are notably lower than the IKE-based
key establishment methods. The total energy spent in a DP
establishment for (3) is on average 15 mJ, and the exchange
is done in less than 1 ms on average.
The evaluation results of the the establishment of a secure
channel between RS and the Client are shown in Figure 9.
Note that only IKE-based establishments perform an IPsec
SA establishment, since in the DP method the IPsec SAs
are provided by the AS. The Client and the RS perform
similarly during (5), as in Figure 4. This result is aligned with
the symmetric nature of the IPsec protocol, since both ends
of the communication play a similar role, unlike protocols
like DTLS where there are a client and a server role with
different responsibilities. However, within this symmetry, it is
noticeable that for the RS, (5) takes longer than for the Client.
The aforementioned difference reflects the fact that the RS
is the initiator party of the IPsec channel establishment.
We can see that the energy spent in transmission state,
label as TX in Figures 7, 8 and 9 appears negligible when
compared with the energy spent at the CPU or in receiving
state, labeled as RX in the aforementioned figures. On the
other hand, RX measurements in the aforementioned figures
represent a significant share of the energy spend during
a protocol run. This behavior is due to the fact that the
reception state is always set to on in our resource-constrained
devices. Energy optimization techniques such as Radio Duty-
cycle (RDC), specified and benchmarked in [30], are out of
the scope of this work
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented our novel ACE IPsec profile
for authentication and authorization in the IoT. Our profile
enables the scalable and flexible establishment of IPsec com-
munication channels between Clients and Resource Servers,
while contextually enforcing fine-grained access control from
the ACE framework. In particular, IPsec Security Associa-
tions can be either directly provided to Client and Resource
Server, or established though the standard IKEv2 key man-
agement protocol. We have implemented the IPsec profile
for the Contiki OS, and carried out an experimental per-
formance evaluation, considering resource-constrained IoT
devices of the Zolertia Firefly platform. Results show that,
under different configurations and authentication modes, our
ACE IPsec profile is affordable also in resource-constrained
devices. Therefore, it is effectively deployable in IoT sce-
narios for successfully enforcing access control paired with
IPsec-based secure communication. Future works will focus
on implementing alternative profiles of ACE and comparing
their performance in resource-constrained IoT settings.
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